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IN THE SUPREME COUR'T
of the

STATE OF UTAH

WAYNE C. CLOSE,
Plaintiff a.nd Respondent,

Case No.
9196

-vs.HAROLD G. BLUMENTHAL and
VIRGINIA A. BLUMEN·THAL,
Defendants and Appellants.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal from a judgment for specific performance of a written instrument entered by the District
Court for Utah County, State of Utah, on December 14th,
1959.
The statement of facts are simple and the matters
presented on this appeal involve principally questions of
law. On the 28th day of April, 1959, at Provo, Utah
3
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County, Utah, Harold G. Blumenthal and Virginia A.
Blumenthal signed an instrument in writing denominated
"Earnest Money Receipt-and Offer to Purchase," as buyers, and by Wayne C. Close as seller, a married man, and
whose wife has never signed the said instrument. The
original earnest money receipt and offer to purchase is
attached to the Findings of the Court, (R. 36).
At the time the Blumenthals signed the earnest
money receipt they deposited with the real estate agent
for the seller the sum of $500.00. Said receipt provided:
"In the event the purchaser fails to pay the
balance of said purchase price, or complete said
purchase as herein provided, the amounts paid
hereon shall, at the option of the seller, be retained
as liquidated and agreed damages."
It was stipulated by and between the parties that
Harold G. Blumenthal notified the attorney for the
plaintiff on or about the 15th day of June, 1959, that
the buyers did not intend to go through with the contract.
It was further stipulated between the parties that the
$500.00 deposit was never returned to the defendants, or
any part thereof prior to the commencement of the action
for specific performance. No offer has been made to return it to the defendants since. (Tr. 3 and±). R. 23.
A complaint was filed by the plaintiff on June 24th,
1959, and prayed for a judgment against the defendant~
to perform said agreement, and to pay the plaintiff the
sum of $25,500.00, the remainder of the purchase price,
with interest from April 28th, 1959, at the rate of 6% per
annum; attorney fees in the amount of $2500.00 and
4
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costs. The defendants filed an answer denying the allegations of the complaint, and amended this answer alleging certain affirmative defenses on July 30th, 1959,
and prayed that plaintiff take nothing by his complaint.
On August 21st, 1959, the defendants filed a motion for
smmnary judgment, (R. 22), which was denied by the
trial court, (R. 24). A petition thereafter was filed with
the Supreme Court requesting an interlocutory appeal
from the motion denying said: judgment, which petition
was denied. The only pertinent facts in dispute are those
set forth in paragraph 3, 5 and 7 of the findings of the
court, (R. 34), to which finding~ the defendant objected,
and filed a motion along with their objecti.ons. to amend
the findings of the court in these respects. The defendants
contending in their objections that there is nothing in
the evidence or the testimony to .warrant the court's
findings as set forth in paragraphs 3, 5 and 7. In other
words the court found "3. That on the 1st day of June,
1959, the plaintiff was ready, able and willing to perfonn
the contract as set forth in the plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1.''
This finding was objected to by the defendants and is
disputed, (R. 43). The defendants disputed and objected
to the findings of the court in paragraph 5 as follows : "5.
The court finds that the foregoing facts were not disputed
by the defendants at the pretrial hearing or at the time of
the trial," which the defendants did dispute and now
dispute and have always disputed. The findings in paragraph 5 would be an admission that the defendants
accepted without dispute the findings set forth in paragraph 3. The court found as set forth in paragraph 7 of
its findings, "7. The court finds that vV ayne C. Close,
5
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the plaintiff, was a married man on April, the 28th, 1959
and on June 1st' 1959. The court further finds that on
June 1st, 1959, the plaintiff was ready, willing and able to
convey the property described in Exhibit 1 by warranty
deed executed by the ·plaintiff and the plaintiff's wife."
The defendants objected to this finding for the reason
that there was never any tender of performance made by
the plaintiff and plaintiff's wife, or by the plaintiff
himself and there is nothing in the evidence to warrant
-such findings by the court. The complaint was not
filed until June 20th, 1959. The earliest date of a
deed, discussed later, is July 30th, 1959. The objections of the defendants to the ·findings of the court
was partially remedied by admission by the plaintiff's
attorney at the hearing on the motion to amend the
findings of the court. (See proceedings on objections
to the court's findings of fact, January 11th, 1960, at
page 3, line 3.)
Therefore the defendants deny, (1) that Wayne C.
Close was ready, able and willing to perform the contract
on the 1st day of June, 1959, as found by the court in
paragraph 3 of its findings. Such finding is clearly outside ·the evidence or record. The same is true with the
finding of the court in paragraph 5 and no deed was ever
introduced into evidence until after both the plaintiff and
the defendants had rested their cases and then allowed
to be introduced t\n) months and one day as a side issue
during the hearing on the n1otion to amend the court's
findings of f aet.

6
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE PLAINTIFF EXERCISED THE OPTION PROVIDED IN THE RECEIPT BY RETENTION OF THE DOWN
PAYMENT, AND THEREBY TERMINA'TED THE AGREEMENT.
POINT II
THE AGREEMENT SUED UPON IS NOT ENFORCEABLE IN ·EQUITY.
POINT III
'THE AGREEMENT IS NOT ENF;ORCEABLE AGAINST
THE DEFENDANTS FOR WANT OF MUTUALITY:
POINT IV
THE PLAINTIFF NEVER MADE A TIMELY OFFER
TO PERFORM THE AGREEMENT.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PLAINTIFF EXERCISED THE OPTION PROVIDED iN THE RECEIPT BY RETENTION OF THE DOWN
PAYMENT, AND THEREBY TERMINATED THE AGREEMENT.

The defendants contend that the case at bar is controlled by the decision of this court on February lOth,
1959, in the case of Andreason vs. Hansen, 335 Pacific
2d, 404, wherein the plaintiff brought an action for
general damages upon the very same ktnd of a receipt
7

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

involved in this case) without ever having returned the
earnest money paid. This court held : upon breach of
the terms of the receipt by the buyers the sellers exercised their option to accept as liquidated damages the
earnest money deposit by retention thereof, and precluded them from further remedy. In the Andreason
Case the Salt Lake Real Estate Board filed a petition
for rehearing, and brief as amicus curiae, again presented the question to this court, under Point No. 2 of
their brief, as follows: "THE HOLDING OF THE
COURT THAT THE RETENTION OF THE DOWN
PAYMENT CONSTITUTED AN ELECTION TO ACCEPT THE DOWN PAYMENT AS LIQUIDATED
DAMAGES IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND HARMFUL TO BOTH BUYERS AND SELLERS." The
Petition for rehearing was denied by this Court.
In the case at bar the plaintiff never returned the
earnest money, or any part thereof, or made any offer
to return the san1e to the defendants at any time. R. 23;
Tr. 3 and 4. On page 408 of the Report of the Andreason
Case Judge Crockett stated:
"A further and fatal failty in the judgment
bY the trial court that the sellers did not exercise

their option to forfeit the defendant's $50.00 deposit. Nat-withstanding the plaintiff's assertion
that they would not keep the Inoney as liquidated
damages, their conduct must be regarded as
speaking louder than their words. The fact is
that the defendant's $50.00 was kept, and that
there \\'as no return, nor tender of return of the
money. \Ve are not unn1indful of the testimony
to the effect that the $50.00 was in the custody
8
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of the Holt Realty ConqJan~L But that company
wa~ the appointed agent and acting for the plaintiff, and the money was thus constructively in
their possession. The plaintiff, as an attorney,
assumed to advise the defendants as to the technical effect of the earnest 1noney receipt. In doing
so he was aware, or should have been, that the
provisions he now relies upon gave him, at best,
a choice of two alternatives; either to keep the
amount paid in as liquidated damages, or to rely
upon the offer to purchase. The fact that the
1noney was kept is incontrovertible evidence that
the plaintiff exercised the option to keep it. That
being so they must be deemed to have kept it for
the purpose indicated in the contract, that is as
liquidated damages."
In the same case, on page 409 of the report, Henroid,
Justice, concurring in the result stated as follows:
"I agree with the result for but one reason
which I consider determinative, and which I believe obviates the necessity of treating any other
phase of this case. It was agreed that the sellers,
at their option, could retain the amount advanced
as liquidated damages if the buyers broke their
promise. The buyers broke their promise and the
sellers retained the amount advanced. In my
opinion such retention constitutes an exercise of
the option, and precluded the sellers from pursueing any other remedy."
The only difference between the Andreason Case
and the Case at Bar is that the Andreason Case was an
action for general damages, whereas the case at bar is
an action for specific performance for the price, which
in actuality is nothing more than an action for damage;;;,
except that the measure of damages is determined by
9
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the amount agreed upon whereas in an action at law
the dmnages are determined by legal rules.
· Again in the Andreason Case Henroid, .Justice,
concurring in the results stated :
"It ,is inconsistent for the sellers holding the
buyers to the. terms of the contract, and at the
same time retain the money that they agreed
would be the measure of damages upon breach, if
they retained it. Such inconsistency must be resolved against the sellers who not only furnished
the printed contract, (as in the case at bar) but
who had the power of election." (words in parentheses are ours). ·
It may be contended by the plaintiff that it is futile
to require him to return the earnest money, prior to a
suit for specific performance, and then require the
defendant to turri around and hand it back as a
part of the purchase price if a judgment is rendered
against him. .The question however, has been resolved
in the Andreason Case, that such retention is an exercise
of option, and that before any other remedy might be
pursued it is necessary for the plaintiff to return the
earnest money to the defendants. The question here
presented cannot be · interpreted as a provision for
(a) security of performance of a contract; or (b) as
one providing for a penalty, but gives the seller an option
to retain as agreed and liquidated damages, the earnest
money deposit or resort to other remedies. It gives him a
right to do one or the other; not a right to do both. So that
if he retains the money paid dmvn without returning
the same or offering to return it before filing a suit for
10
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specific perforumnce he already has Inade the choice
open to hiin; has exercised his option to take liquidated
damages in lieu of other relief.
We are not dealing with a provision in a contract
where the sun1 forfeited Inight be accounted as liquidated damages, but with one that gives the seller a
choice to accept the money as liquidated damages upon
breach of the buyer, or not to accept it and otherwise
stand on the promise. If by his actions he does the first,
the choice has been made and the option spent. He does
not have another or second choice; he has but one, and
by choosing the first it follows that he is precluded from
pursuing the second. The same rule applies whether the
action is one for damages at law, for breach of the
defendant's promise or by a suit in equity for specific
performance of the promise.
The measure of relief agreed upon is set forth in
the printed form furnished by the plaintiff. He could
not keep the money paid down on the one hand as liquidated damages and at the same time claim other and
additional relief on the other, since the first is a substitute for the latter.
If the option provision to retain as liquidated damages the earnest money, diCI not provide for adequate
and satisfactory relief in case of breach by the buyer,
why did the seller make it a part of the contract at all1
Other remedies open to him already existed as a matter
of equity and law. Was it inserted as a penalty 1 No.
As security for performance1 No. As this court has
11
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held on that very question involving the identical option
in the same kind of a receipt :
"The fact that the money was kept is incon:.
trovertible evidence that the plaintiff exercised
the option to keep it. That being so, they must
be deemed to have kept it for a purpose indicated
in the contract, that is, as liquidated damages."
· Andreason vs. Hanson, 335 Pac. 2d. Page 408. ,
In Rose vs. Garn, 56 Utah 533, 191·Pacific 645, this
Court held
"Under an agreement whereby abstract and
. deed were placed in escrow and were to be delivered to grantee upon .payment of certain
amounts and providing for forfeiture of sums
paid as liquidated damages, on buyer's breach,
held, that failure of the grantee to make one of
such payments terminated the transaction, and
the vendor was entitled only to retention of the
inst.allments paid and repossession of the property and could not specifi;cally enforce the agreement as a contract of sale of the property."
In the case at bar the defendants have never been
in possession of the premises set forth in the plaintiffs
Complaint.
In Dropp vs. Richards, 43 Utah 341, 135 Pac. 99, this
court held:
"Unless a contract is oppressive, unconscionable, or against public policy, the courts will allow
the parties to stipulate for themselves whether a
provision for a forfeiture shall be a penalty or
liquidated damages."
Whether a stipulation for forfeiture of breach of
an executory contract shall be construed as a penalty,
12
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or a~ liquidated dan1ages, n1ust be detennined from the
terms of the contract.
""Where an executory contract for the sale of
land provided for the forfeiture, as liquidated
damages, of the amount of the payments made by
the purchaser in the event of his failure to complete the purchase, and it appeared that the advance pay1nents required to be made by the purchaser were practically equal to the rental value
of the land for the time he was in possession
under the contract, and that such payments added·
to the value of the land at the time the vendor
took it, exceeded the total amount due under the
contract, including interest, the stipulation will
be treated as one for liquidated damages, and not
as a penalty regardless of whether the purchaser
had made the advanced payments called for by
the contract." Cooley vs. Call, 61 Utah 203, 211
Pac. 977.
Defendants have never clai1ned to own the property
either equitably or legally, but have been bound to do
nothing more than to forfeit the $500.00, or pay the
balance of the purchase price and require the conveyance of the property, at the option of the seller. The
fact is, that the plaintiff is in as good position now as
when he Inade the contract, as he has the property and
he has shown no damage at all, and in view of this fact
the forfeiture of $500.00 is adequate compensation.
In Cooley vs. Gall, 211 Pacific 977, at the top of page
980 this court said :
"There is little or no difference in principle
between that case (the Dopp Case) and this. In
that case the plaintiff resumed possession of the

13
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land and brought an action for damages. In this
case the plaintiff sued for specific performance
of the contract. The rules in each case are the
same for deterrn/tning the question whether or not
the damages stipulated in the contract are to be
reg.arded as liquidated, and therefore exclus~ve of
other remedies,. or whether they- are a penalty for
non performance. In that case, (the· Dopp Case)
this court, after a careful review. of the facts and
the law applicable thereto, 43 Utah, Page 341, 135
Pacific, Page ·102, uses the following language:
'Take any view we please of the contract in question, its terms were all fair and entirely proportioned to the damages that might be sustained,
upon the one hand, or the benefits that might
accrue the other. Under such circumstances the
court is not justified in departing from the terms
of the ~ontract with regard to the damage stipulated· therein but is required to enforce that stirpulatvon the same as all other stipulations in the
contract.' "
uwe are of the opinion therefore that the
amount ~stipulated as constituting liquvdated.damages in the contract in question cannot be constnted as a penalty, but mu,st be held to be liquidated dam.ages, and must be enforced as·such."
(words in parentheses are ours).
POIN'T II
THE AGREEMENT SUED UPON IS NOT ENFORCEABLE IN. EQUITY.

"Where the parties to any agreement, whatever may be the subject 1natter, or the terms,
have added a provision for the payment, in case
of a breach, of a c.ertain sum which is truly liquidated damages, and not a penalty - in other
14
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words where the contract stipulates for one of two
things in the alternative, the performance of
certain acts, or the payment of a certain amount
of rnoney in lieu thereof, equity will not interfere
to decree a specific performance of the first alternative, but will leave the injured party to his
legal remedy of recovering the money specified
in the second. The reason for this rule is, that
the parties have formally agreed upon the compensation - have assessed 'the damages - and
have thereby declared that an appeal to equity is
unnecessary, since they have made the l~gal relief
adequate.'' Pomeroy, Specific Performance of
Contracts, 3rd Edition, Section 50, Page 134.
If the parties to the receipt have provided therein
for liquidated damages in breach of the conditions thereof by the buyer, they have provided for an adequate
remedy at law as has been held.in the Andreason vs.
Hansen, and therefore, equity would not take jurisdiction to grant specific performance.
"A complete and adequate legal remedy
authorizes denial of specific performance." Halloran Judge Trust ·Co. vs. Heath, 258 Pac. 242, 70
Utah 124.
We can find no cases where an option provision in
the contract, such as the one at .bar, has been made for
the benefit of the seller, and he has exercised that option
by retention of the down payment, that he has thereafter
been given the right of specific performance.
In line 44 of the original receipt, R. 36, attached to
the Findings of the court the following is provided:
"In the event seller has entered into a listing
contract with any other agent, and said contract

15
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is presently effective this paragraph will be of
no force or effect."
The paragraph refe~red to includes lines 39 to 44
inclusive. Therefore, until there is evidence that another
listing has not been made by the seller, making the receipt
presently effective, specific performance should not be
entertained. It is inequitable and unjust to permit the
plaintiff to specifically enforce a contract before it has
been proven that no previous listing has been made with
other brokers. It cannot be determined that there is a
complete and binding contract until such fact is established or that a complete and enforceable contract exists.
An elementary rule in equity is :
"A greater amount or degree of certainty is
required in the terms of an agreement which is
to be specifically executed in equity than is necessary in a contract which is to be the basis of an
action at law .for damages." Pomeroy Specific
Performance of Contracts, 3rd Edition, Section
159, Page 404.

POINT III
THE AGREEMENT IS NOT ENFORCEABLE AGAINST
THE DEFENDANTS FOR WANT OF MUTUALITY.

In the case at bar the wife of the plaintiff never
signed the receipt upon which the action is brought, nor
was she ever made a party plaintiff to the action.
Iri Candland vs. Oldroyd, et al, 67 Utah 605, 248
Pacific, 1101, this court held on page 1103 of the report

as follows:
16
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"A contract to be binding upon one must
likewise be binding upon the other. If one party
has a right to insist upon specific performance,
the other party to the contract must likewise have
the same right. Tested by the elementary considerations that enter into every contract, we are
unable to conclude that any contract existed,
growing out of this correspondence.''
In Woolsey vs. Draper, et ux, 103 Ore. 103, 201 Pac.
730, the Supreme Court of Oregon held:
"The rule is settled in this State that in suits
for specific performance of contracts for the sale
of land, where the wife having a right of dower
in the land, is sued jointly with her husband upon
a contract not binding on her, and the object of
the suit is to divest her of her inchoate right of
dower, the suit cannot be maintained against her
nor against her husband unless prior to the decree
in the lower court the plaintiff elects to accept
the deed of the husband alone because as to her
the contract lacks mutuality. The court will not
coerce the wife to perform a contract made by
her husband alone, which she is not legally bound
to perform. This rule, however, must be limited to
cases where the wife has a present existing right
of dower in the lands involved." See Weatherford
vs. Weatherford et al, 260 P 2d 1097.
If the parties in this action had been reversed the
plaintiff could not have coerced the wife to perform the
contract or give up her inchoate dower intere~t for the
reason that she was not a party to the contract, and
therefore, if the contract lacks mutuality as to her, it
17
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also lacks mutuality as to the defendants in the present
case when they are sued by the plaintiff alone, the
wife of the plaintiff being neither a party to the action
nor a signatory to the receipt.
It may be stated, as was affirmed in the case of
Candland vs. Oldroyd above, that if one party has a right
to insist upon specific perfO'rmance the other party to the
contract must likewise have the same right, and the
reverse of it is, that, if one party doesn't have the right
neither does the other.
In Hart vs. Turner, 226 Pacific 282, 39 Idaho, 50,
the court held :
"Where from the inception of the contract,
to and including the time of the trial, the vendor
in a contract for the sale of land is unable to
perform the contract according to its terms, specific performance "\\ill not be decreed against the
vendee." Tucker vs. Finch, 188 Pacific 235.
"Specific performance of a contract will not
be compelled where its validity depends upon the
approval of a third person, and where the consent or approval of such third person has not
been obtained, and tendered at the time specific
performance is sought."

Hardy vs. Deskins, 215 Pacific, 738, 95 Oklahoma,
108.

"The test of n1utuality in specific performance action is rnutuality of remedy whether the
agreement is such that equity would decree
18
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specific perfonnance for either party." Wheat
vs. Thomas, 209 Cal.· 306, 287 Pac. 102. 1
"To be specifically enforceable, an agreement
must be definite in its terms, and party seeking
specific perf()rrnance must establish by clear and
satisfactory proof, the existence of the contract
alleged." Store Properties vs. Neal, 164 Pacific
2d 38, 72 California Appeals 2d, 112.
The theory upon which a vendor of real property
can sue in specific performance for the price is that of
mutuality of remedy, otherwise damages at law would
be an adequate remedy, and he would thereby be precluded from sueing in equity for specific performance.
But since a purchaser of land (land bein·g regarded as
unique) can maintain a suit for specific performance,
equity on the basis of mutuality of remedy usually grants
the vendor the right to specific performance ·when he is
only to receive money. This being so, it is very important that Inutuality of remedy exists in favor of the
vendee, otherwise a great advantage is given to the
vendor if he can compel specific execution of a land contract against a purchaser, when the vendor's wife has
not signed, and he sues ·only for the price. If the purchaser cannot sue and obtain the whole estate of both
the seller and his wife, then the seller ought not to be
tAlso the same effect, Hupp vs. Lawler, 288 Pacific, 801,
106 California Appeals, 121. Moody vs. Crane, 199 Pacific,
652, 34 Idaho, 103. Poultry Producers of Southern California
vs. Barlow, 208 Pacific 93, 189 Cal. 278. See also Parker vs.
Grainger, 149 Pacific 2d, 625, 158 Kansas, 706. Schneidau vs.
Manley, 39 Atlantic 2d, 885, 131 Connecticut 285. Ray Richardson, Inc. vs. Carlton, 191 Southern 433, 140 Florida 229.
Baumann vs. Mchel, 181 Southern 549, 190 Louisiana, 1. Also
176 Southern 907.
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granted specific performance against the purchasers for
the price. It is doubly important that mutuality of remedy
exists in favor of the vendee as well as in favor of the
vendor, for the latter can sue in damages for his money
loss. But the loss of land, it is said, cannot be measured
in money. 1
POINT IV
THE PLAINTIFF NEVER MADE A TIMELY OFFER
TO PERFORM THE AGREEMENT.

The earnest money receipt (R. 36) provides in lines
12 to 15 inclusive as follows:
"The total purchase price of $26,000.00
(Twenty Six Thousand and no j100 Dollars) shall
be payable as follows: $-------------------------------which
represents the afore described deposit, receipt of
which is hereby ackknowledged by you; $------------·---------------- when the seller approves the sale: $25,500.00 on delt"very of deed or final contract of
sale which shall be on or before June 1st, 1959

***
This agreement requires the seller to deliver a deed
on or before the 1st day of June, 1959, before the defendants, as buyers, would be liable to pay the $25,500.00, the
balance of the purchase price. The seller never performed or offered to perforn1 the contract on June 1st,
1959, and no such offer to perfonn \vas ever made,
except the deed above referred to as being admitted in
evidence on January 11th, 1960, at the tilne of the
lSee State Extrel-Place vs. Bland, 183 SW 2d, 878, 353 Mo., 639,
Rice vs. Griffith, 144, SW 2d, 837, 56 NE 2d, 607, 316 Mass., 517,
Lutz vs. Dutmer, 382 NW 431, 286 Mich. 467.
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hearing on the defendant's motion to mnend the findings
of the court. There is absolutely no proof in the record of
any tender of performance on the part of the plaintiff
on June 1st, 1959, or at any other time during the trial.
The deed admitted in evidence was allowed to be introduced two months and one day after the conclusion
of the trial, and over the objections of the defendants,
and without the court ever having reopened the case for
the admission .of new evidence. See Tr. of Proceedings,
Jan. 11, 1960, at page 4, line 23 to line 3 on page 5, also
lines 16 and 17 on page 5.
In paragraph 3 of plaintiff's complaint, (R. 3) plaintiff does allege that he was ready, willing and able to
deliver to the defendant the deed to the premises pursuant to the agreement and offered ·to do so, etc. ,This
allegation ·however, was denied by the answer of the defendants, filed on July the 8th, 1959. This denial of the
defendants was never altered or withdrawn but they
amended the answer to effectuate setting up affirmative
defenses which they did by an amendment to the answer,
filed on July 30th, 1959. (R. 12 and 13.)

It is true that the court in its findings, in paragraph .
7, found that the plaintiff and his wife were able, ready
and willing to convey the property described in Exhibit
1, by warranty deed executed by the plaintiff and the
plaintiff's wife. This _finding, of course, was objected to
and the motion to amend it was made by the defendants.
A hearing thereon was held January 11th, 1960. The
paragraph was amended in some respects, to wit: "that
the plaintiff Wayne C. Close, was at all times during the
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proceedings herein, a married man," but the finding that
the plaintiff, Wayne C. Close, and his wife, were ready,
able and willing to convey the property by warranty
deed executed by them is that part of the finding which
has no justification, and there is no evidence, and such
fact was never proved, or offered to be proved by a deed
then executed. The wife of the plaintiff was never in
Court to testify and was never a party to the suit. The
first time there was any tangible evidence of a deed
was when it was filed four days after the judgment
on December 18th, 1959. Both the plaintiff and the
defendant had rested their cases on November 10, 1959.
(Tr. 28, lines 13 and 15) It had never been introduced into
evidence. The court's attention is called to the fact that
this deed is dated the 16th day of December, 1959, two
days after the judgment, together with its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law were signed and filed by the
court. (R. 46). It will be noted that this deed is dated De- .
cember 16th, 1959, signed by Wayne C. Close and Norma
W. Close, and acknowledged before Dallas H. Young, Jr.,
who filled in the blank, and the date when his commission
expires and his residence, and also the blank left for
mailing the tax notice to Harold G. Blumenthal. There
is another deed which appears on the scene, and this one
is signed by Wayne C. Close and Norma W. Close but
dated July 30th, 1959. It was this deed that was admitted into evidence two months and one day after the
conclusion of the case, over the objection of counsel for
the defendants, without reopening the case, or any order
to that effect having been made, but toward the termination of the hearing on the defendant's objection to the
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court's findings of fact. and nwtion to mnend them.
It will be noted that this deed is dated prior to the first
deed filed, but was never, offered into evidence until
January 11th, 1960, and filed that day. On this deed
the expiry date of the Notary's com1nission is not filled
in, or his residence, with the mail tax notice left blank
and also the residence of the grantees. One wonders
why this deed, if in existence, was not filed first. Pretrial
hearing was on the same day as this deed is dated. It
was on January 11, 1960, that the plaintiff's attorney
reminded the court he had in his possession at time of
the pretrial this deed. (See proceedings of January 11th,
1960 on the defendant's motion to amend the findings,
at page 4, lines 4, 5 and 6.)
It is elmnentary that before the plaintiff can obtain
specific performance of this contract he himself must
allege· and prove his offer to perform, or prove that he
has fulfilled it or was willing to fulfill ~e contract, and
no such evidence can be found during the trial of this case.
The belated offer of the plaintiff to introduce a deed into
evidence two Inonths and one day after the conclusion
of the trial is irregular ~nd erroneous and it was error
for the court to admit the same. Counsel for the plaintiff states that counsel for the defendants stipulated at
the pretrial that there was no question of the plaintiff's
offer to perforn1 or any question about the title he was
to convey. Counsel for the defendants ernphatically deny
this. There was no such stipulation and none can be found.
The defendants have always contended, that without the
plaintiff's wife's signature on the contract, he could not
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be made to convey the whole e~tate in the property; and
without first offering to perform pn the date due, or at
least by introducing such offer seasonably and properly
into evidence, the defendants were never bound. Such is
their position now and has been consistently, regardless
of the findings of the court and the innuendos of counsel.
In Altman vs. McDonald, 12, Atlantic 2d, 230, 64
Rhode Island, 311 the court held :
"In suit for specific performance for contract for sale of real estate, complainant had
burden of showing that he was ready, able and
willing to perform his part of the contract on the
date when the performance was due· under the
terms of the contract."
Before the plaintiff can put the defendants in default
so as to be able to sue for specific performance, he himself must have made a good tender, or performance on
his part, by offering a deed on the date due, according
to the terms of the earnest money receipt. Here the
balance of the purchase price was to be paid upon t~e
tender of the deed on June 1, 1959. However, a deed
was never tendered. 1
It is therefore respectfully submitted that in accord-·
ance with the law and the facts of this case and the
authorities herein cited, that the defendants are entitled
to a judgment; that the plaintiff take nothing by his
complaint, and that the case be remanded to the District
lSee also Long v. Reiss. 160 SW 2d, 668, 290 Ky. 198. Also, Kunz
vs. Peters, 150 SW, 2d, 665, Dodge vs. Blood, 11 NW 2d, 846, 307
Mich. 169. See Pomeroy, Specific Performance, 3rd Edition, Section
62, Page 775.
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Court for Utah County, with instructions to enter its
judgment for the defendants and against the plaintiff.
Respectfully submitted,
GLE.N S. HATCH
A. M. MARSDEN
616 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Defendants
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